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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear this appeal is 
conferred by §§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) , Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. The appeal is from a judgment in favor of the 
Respondents after a bench trial before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Third Judicial District Court, on a claim pursuant to 
§ 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for judgment in the amount 
of the balance due after a trust deed foreclosure against real 
property. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Was it error for the trial court to refuse as not 
relevant to the issue of fair market value, evidence of the prior 
fair market value of the property? 
2. Was the trustee's sale under a trust deed given 
pursuant to Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
invalid as a matter of law by virtue of the beneficiary stating 
that her bid was to purchase the property at its then fair market 
value rather than bidding a specific dollar amount? 
3. Was the finding as to fair market value of the property 
at the time of trustee's sale supported by the weight of the 
evidence? 
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STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Sections 57-1-27, 28 and 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are 
to be interpreted, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought suit to recover the difference between 
the unpaid balance owing on a promissory note and the fair market 
value of real property against which they had foreclosed under a 
trust deed lien given as security. Defendant alleged that the 
trustee's sale was invalid and that the fair market value of the 
real property was in excess of the amount which Plaintiffs 
claimed under their promissory note. The court found an amount 
of $29,622.62 owing under the promissory note, that attorney fees 
in an amount of $4,980.00 had been incurred by Plaintiffs with 
regard to the action and that the fair market value of the real 
property at the time of trustee's sale was $21,750.00. R. 159, 
160? Appendix. The court awarded Plaintiffs damages of $7,872.62 
representing the amount owing to Plaintiffs at time of trustee's 
sale less the then fair market value of the real property and 
additionally awarded Plaintiffs their attorney fees incurred in 
the action. R. 155. Defendant brings this appeal seeking a 
determination that the trustee's sale was invalid, that the 
court's finding as to the fair market value of the real property 
was against the weight of the evidence and a reversal of the 
judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is an attorney licensed to practice in Utah since 
1982. Tr. 171, 172. He purchased from Plaintiffs property 
located at 448 North Grant Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Tr. 10, 
11, 162. The purchase was in September, 1984. Tr. 11, 162. The 
property was a single family residence of some 60 years of age. 
Plaintiffs1 Exh. 3 at 1; Defendant's Exh. 5 at 3. Defendant paid 
a down payment of $8,000.00 and signed and delivered to 
Plaintiffs a $25,000.00 promissory note and a trust deed granting 
to Plaintiffs a lien against the property for the purpose of 
securing payment of the promissory note. R. 3, 16; Tr. 13, 26. 
On September 5, 1985, Defendant resold the property to Robert B. 
Stonehocker. Tr. 156, 162. No payments were made under the 
promissory note from and after March 21, 1987. R. 3, 16. 
Defendant understood that he remained responsible to make such 
payments. Tr. 173-174. 
On November 24, 1987, the property was sold at trustee's 
sale. Tr. 11, 12. The Defendant was aware that payments under 
the promissory note were in arrears and he had been served with 
the notice of default and the notice of sale, but had elected not 
to attend the trustee's sale. Tr. 167, 168. The sale was 
attended only by the tenant then occupying the property and by 
Plaintiff, Kathleen M. Thomas, who was there representing all 
Plaintiffs. Tr. 11, 25. Only the Plaintiffs bid at the 
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trustee's sale. Tr. 12. Mrs. Thomas did not know the fair 
market value of the property and so did not bid a dollar amount, 
but rather stated that her bid was for the then fair market value 
of the property. Tr. 12, 13, 25, 26. She testified she was 
prepared to bid as much as $26,000.00 if Defendant or someone 
else had bid. Tr. 13. Plaintiffs received a trustee's deed to 
the property. R. 5, 16. The property was first inspected by 
Plaintiffs after the trustee's sale. Tr. 16, 17. The inspection 
determined the property to be in disrepair. Tr. 17, 32. 
Plaintiffs listed the property for sale with a realtor, Ms. 
Joan Rushton Carlson, on December 7, 1987. Tr. 15, 16 and 43. 
Ms. Carlson arranged to have the property appraised to determine 
market value. Tr. 45, 46. The appraisal was undertaken by 
appraiser, Paul H. Maritsas, on December 10, 1987, and he 
completed the same on December 23, 1987. Tr. 66, 80. Mr. 
Maritsas determined the fair market value of the property to be 
$21,750.00 as of the date of December 23, 1987. Tr. 79, 80; 
Plaintiffs' Exh. 3 at 2. Mr. Maritsas testified that in his 
opinion his valuation would have been the same for the November 
24, 1987 date of the trustee's sale. Tr. 88, 89. 
The initial price at which Plaintiffs listed the property 
for sale was $32,000.00. Tr. 43. Mrs. Thomas testified the 
property was listed at that price not knowing its actual value, 
not having the benefit of an appraisal, but knowing that such was 
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the approximate price at which it had been sold to the Defendant 
in 1984, Tr. 36, 37. On February lf 1988, the listing price of 
the property was reduced to the Maritsas appraised value of 
$21/750.00. Tr. 46. From the time of the initial listing the 
property was continually advertised for a period of seven months 
in a bi-weekly trade magazine, was the subject of a realtors1 
open housef an office inspection/ a realtors1 bus tour and was 
continually over multiple listing. Tr. 44, 47. 
In June of 1988 an offer was received for the purchase of 
the property for a price of $20f500.00f with a down payment of 
$500.00 and the balance payable in deferred payments. Tr. 48/ 
51; Plaintiffs' Exh. 2 at 1. One month later the property was 
sold to the offeror pursuant to the offered terms. Tr. 19f 51; 
Plaintiffs' Exh. 2 at 3-8. Ms. Carlson had showed the property 
to several prospective buyers during the seven months that it was 
listed/ but had received only the one offer to purchase. Tr. 19/ 
48/ 49. 
On July 6/ 1988/ Defendant retained Mr. Richard Copeland to 
do a value appraisal of the property. The appraisal was 
completed one day later. Tr. 137. Mr. Copeland's written 
appraisal was received in evidence. Tr. 139; Defendant's 
Exhibit 5. He opined the property to have a value of $31,800.00 
as of November 27/ 1987/ said date being three days following the 
trustee's sale. The Defendant testified that in his opinion the 
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property had a value of between $30,000.00 and $35f000.00 at the 
time of the trustee's sale. Tr. 170. His attorney elicited 
testimony from Kathleen Thomas that when Plaintiffs sold the 
property to Defendant they received an $8,000.00 down payment and 
a promissory note for $25,000.00. Tr. 26. In response to 
Plaintiff's objection, the court refused as irrelevant, 
Defendant's proffered testimony as to the price which he had paid 
to purchase the property from Plaintiffs in September of 1984 and 
at which he had resold the property to Mr. Stonehocker in 
September of 1985. Tr. 162-164. Additionally, the court 
sustained Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's attempt to elicit 
the opinion of Kathleen Thomas as to the value of the property 
when sold to the Defendant in September, 1984, and as to whether 
she had at that time obtained a value appraisal of the property. 
Tr. 28, 29. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The refusal of the court to permit testimony regarding the 
sales price of the property two and three years before the 
trustee's sale and opinion testimony regarding the value of the 
property four years before trustee's sale as not relevant to the 
issue of fair market value on date of the sale by the trustee was 
proper. In no event would it constitute prejudicial error. The 
court had permitted Defendant to testify as to his opinion of 
value at the date of the trustee's sale and to elicit testimony 
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from Plaintiff/ Kathleen Thomas, reflecting Defendant's 
September, 1984, purchase price of $33,000.00. The court 
accepted written appraisal reports separately commissioned by 
Plaintiffs and Defendant opining as to the fair market value of 
the property on the date of the trustee's sale. It accepted full 
and complete testimony from the parties regarding post-trustee's 
sale efforts to market the property and the terms and conditions 
of its eventual sale some seven months later. All was a 
sufficient and proper basis for the court's finding as to fair 
market value at the date of the trustee's sale. 
Defendant with full legal notice of the trustee's sale 
elected not to attend or bid in accordance with his opinion of 
the then fair market value of the property. His attendance and 
his bid of the price which he testified as representing fair 
market value would have constituted his the successful bid, 
required his payment of the bid price, and would have been 
sufficient to retire his obligation to Plaintiffs and preclude 
Plaintiffs' action. The trustee's sale and Plaintiffs' credit of 
an amount equivalent to the then fair market value of the 
property against the Defendant's payment obligation was in 
accordance with Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
and afforded Defendant the protection contemplated by law. 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick identified in open court that 
evidence which he perceived to be persuasive with regard to a 
-7-
determination of fair market value of the property. His finding 
is supported by the weight of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR FAIR MARKET 
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
Defendant objects to the trial court's refusal to permit 
evidence of the value of the Grant Street property two, three and 
four years before the date for which the court was required to 
determine fair market value. 
Section 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, outlines the 
findings to be made by the court in an action to recover the 
unpaid balance due upon an obligation secured by a trust deed 
lien against real property where the property has been foreclosed 
by power of sale and sold at trustee's sale. The text of the 
Section is hereto appended. It reads in pertinent part: 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value at the date of sale of the property 
sold. 
The trustee's sale of the property occurred November 24, 
1987. Tr. 11, 12. Defendant contends that the court wrongfully 
refused to accept his proffer of evidence of (1) a November 26, 
1983 appraisal report, (2) the price Defendant paid to Plaintiffs 
to purchase the property on September 21, 1984, (3) an appraisal 
report of fair market value on November 20, 1984, and (4) the 
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price at which Defendant resold the property on September lf 1985 
to Mr. Robert Stonehocker. The record will show that evidence of 
the price Defendant paid to purchase the property was already 
before the court at the time of his proffer and further, that he 
made no proffer of evidence as to either the November, 1983 
appraisal or the November, 1984 appraisal. 
Defendant sought to elicit testimony from Kathleen Thomas as 
to whether she had obtained an appraisal of the property prior to 
the September, 1984 sale to the Defendant. Tr. 29. Plaintiff's 
objection as to relevancy was sustained. Defendant made no 
proffer as to the evidence sought to be elicited. He now 
contends that he was seeking evidence of a written appraisal 
report setting fair market value at a date in 1983, some four 
years prior to the valuation date with which the court was 
concerned. Assuming that the court had required Mrs. Thomas to 
testify that she had obtained such an appraisal, it then would 
have been required to address the hearsay ramifications inherent 
in considering the opinion of value as represented by the report 
and in determining the weight to be accorded the report. 
Defendant did not represent to the court that he was prepared to 
introduce the report or call as a witness the appraiser whose 
work and opinion it represented. An appropriate proffer was not 
made. 
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Defendant testified that he had purchased the property from 
Plaintiffs in about September of 1984. The court thereupon 
sustained Plaintiff's objection on relevancy grounds to 
Defendant's testimony of the price which he had paid for the 
property. Tr. 162. However, Defendant had previously elicited 
testimony from Kathleen Thomas that in purchasing the property, 
he had paid Plaintiffs a down payment of $8,000.00 and delivered 
to them his promissory note for $25,000.00. Tr. 26. In other 
words, evidence of his $33,000.00 purchase price for the property 
was already before the court. 
There is no basis in the record for Defendant's contention 
that he was refused an opportunity to provide evidence as to an 
appraisal obtained from Paul J. Lund as of November 20, 1984. No 
such proffer was made and therefore none was rejected. At no 
time did the Defendant make any inquiry with regard to a 
November, 1984 appraisal or with regard to one prepared by 
Paul J. Lund or one prepared on behalf of Congressional Mortgage, 
Inc. Once again, the Defendant was asked by his attorney to 
testify as to the price which he paid to purchase the property in 
September, 1984, and the price for which he sold the property to 
Robert Stonehocker in September of 1985. Tr. 162, 163. It is 
impossible to find any attempt to introduce testimony with regard 
to a November, 1984 appraisal. There is neither Defendant's 
proffer nor the court's rejection. 
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The court precluded, as not relevant, Defendant's testimony 
of the price at which he resold the property to Robert 
Stonehocker in September of 1985. Tr. 163, 164. Mr. Stonehocker 
had previously testified that he took the property from Mr. 
Johnson as a trade in a real estate transaction. Tr. 156. 
Clearly, the price assigned by the Defendant and Mr. Stonehocker 
to the property for trade purposes could not alone be relevant. 
Further evidence would be required as to what extent the exchange 
of properties determined the value then assigned to the property 
and as to adjustments necessary to bring that value in line with 
a non-exchange price. 
Irrespective of whether any or all of the evidence rejected 
by the court can stand the test of relevancy, the precluding of 
that evidence would not constitute reversible error. In State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
determined: 
Errors we label 'harmless' are errors which, although 
properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is 
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. 
The evidence presented by the Defendant would lead one to 
conclude that the rejected testimony would not have affected the 
court's finding as to fair market value. Defendant's own 
appraiser, Richard Copeland, opined that the fair market value at 
the applicable valuation date was $31,800.00. Such was more than 
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$13,000.00 less than both the November, 1983 appraised value and 
the claimed sales price to Robert Stonehocker in September, 1985. 
It is $7,000.00 less than what Defendant contends was the value 
determined by the November 20, 1984 appraisal and more than 
$1,000.00 less than the price which he paid for the property in 
September of 1984. Finally, and perhaps most persuasive, is 
Defendant's own testimony over the objection of Plaintiffs1 
counsel that he believed the property to have a value of between 
$30,000.00 and $35,000.00 as of the valuation date. Tr. 169, 
170. Such evidence as received by the court taken with that 
addressing the efforts undertaken by the Plaintiffs over a period 
of some seven months to market the property, which efforts 
resulted in only one offer having been received and the eventual 
sale of the property at that offering price, clearly establishes 
that in all events the trial court would have found the value of 
the property at $21,750.00. 
In open court, Judge Frederick analyzed the evidence which 
he had received as to the value of the property, addressed the 
condition of the property at the time of trustee's sale, efforts 
made to rehabilitate and market the same and compared the 
appraisals made by Mr. Paul Maritsas and Mr. Richard Copeland. 
Tr. 178, 179. It is clear that the additional evidence which 
Defendant contends he was entitled to submit would have been 
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neither helpful nor persuasive to the court, even if properly 
proffered and received. 
POINT II. 
THE TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS NOT 
INVALID AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiffs1 bid at the trustee's sale was not in a specified 
dollar amount. Tr. 26. Defendant contends that as a consequence 
the sale was invalid because (1) Plaintiffs1 bid was not the 
highest bid received by the trustee, (2) the trustee was required 
to postpone the sale and the failure to do so invalidated the 
same, (3) the trustee failed to require payment of the purchase 
price in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale 
and (4) Defendant had insufficient time in which to obtain a 
separate appraisal more persuasive to the trial court in its 
determination of fair market value of the property. 
1. 
SALE WAS TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER. 
Section 57-1-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, dictates the 
procedure to be followed by the trustee in conducting a 
foreclosure sale in accordance with the power of sale provisions 
of a trust deed against real property. The text of the statute 
is appended to this brief. In relevant part, the Section 
provides: 
On the date and at the time and place designated 
in the notice of sale, the trustee or the attorney for 
the trustee shall sell the property at public auction 
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to the highest bidder. . . Any person, including the 
beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every bid 
is considered an irrevocable offer, . . . . 
Not only was Plaintiffs1 the highest bid, it was the only 
bid. Tr. 12. Mrs. Kathleen Thomas, representing the Plaintiffs 
at the sale, did not know the fair market value of the property 
and so did not bid a specific dollar amount, but rather stated 
that her bid was for the then fair market value of the property. 
Tr. 12, 13, 25, 26. 
Section 57-1-27 outlines the procedure to be followed by the 
trustee if there are competing bids. When only one bid is given, 
he has no alternative under the statute other than to sell to 
that bidder irrespective of the price bid. Such does not 
disadvantage the trustor for two reasons. First, the trustor has 
already received the statutory three-month notice of default as 
prescribed by § 57-1-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the 
notice of trustee's sale required by § 57-1-25, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Both notices were received by this Defendant. 
Tr. 167. Secondly, § 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
requires that the fair market value of the property at the time 
of the sale or the price at which the property is sold by the 
trustee, whichever is the greater, shall be credited against the 
unpaid balance of the obligation for which the trust deed was 
given as security. 
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The text of the Section 57-1-32 is appended to this brief. 
The pertinent part is as follows: 
At any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, 
an action may be commenced to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security. . . . Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the date of 
sale of the property sold. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount 
of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses 
of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the 
date of the sale. 
At the sale, Mrs. Thomas advised the trustee that she was 
bidding the fair market value of the property. By so doing, 
Plaintiffs assured Defendant that he would receive full credit 
for the then fair market value of the property. Such was in 
compliance with the safeguards which the statute extended to the 
Defendant. What then remained to be done was for the Plaintiffs 
to obtain an appraisal to determine fair market value of the 
property. They completed that process one month later. Tr. 80. 
This action was later commenced on February 22, 1988 with the 
filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint wherein the fair market value of 
the property was alleged to have been $22,000.00. R. 2, 5. 
Defendant claims that the failure to bid a sum certain 
violated safeguards extended to him by statute. He has the 
burden of proving his contention. Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (1987). For 
the reasons above given, statutory safeguards were not violated, 
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and the sale was conducted within the spirit and purpose of the 
statute. On the other hand, if a technical violation did occur, 
still the Defendant cannot show, and in fact does not attempt to 
show, how he has been damaged or prejudiced. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a trustee's sale "will not be set aside 
unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was 
some attendant fraud or unfair dealing." Id. at 1160, quoting 
McHue v. Church, 583 P.2d 210 at 215, 216 (Alaska 1978). 
The Defendant is an attorney licensed to practice in Utah. 
Tr. 171, 172. He received full legal notice of the sale and yet 
elected not to attend. Tr. 167, 168. He had some four months 
time before the scheduled sale date, in which to commission an 
appraisal to determine fair market value of the property. He did 
not do so. He testifies that he then believed the property to 
have had a value between $30,000.00 and $35,000.00. If he had 
availed himself of the safeguards afforded by the statute by both 
attending the sale and bidding what he then believed to be the 
value of the property, he would have been the successful 
purchaser. Kathleen Thomas testified that had the Defendant bid 
at the sale, she was prepared to bid as high as $26,000.00. 
Tr. 13. Clearly, the Defendant would either have induced that 
higher bid by the Plaintiffs, thereby increasing the credit which 
he was to have received against his unpaid obligation or would 
have made a higher bid which would have resulted in his acquiring 
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title to the property. His failure to do so now precludes his 
right to claim "foul". 
In American Falls Canal Securities Company v. American 
Savings & Loan Association, 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1989) the Utah 
Supreme Court determined as follows: 
The principles of waiver and estoppel have application 
in determining the rights of parties to foreclosure 
sales. Hence, a party otherwise in position to object 
to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded 
from doing so based upon conduct sufficient to bring 
into operation the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
The American Falls court went on to quote from 55 Am Jur 2d, 
Mortgages § 861: 
(A) Mortgagor may by acquiescence and failure to 
assert his rights at the proper time be estopped to set 
up irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings to 
defeat rights of the purchaser. . . 
If to any extent, the trustee's sale was not in compliance 
with statute, neither prejudice nor damage was thereby imposed 
upon Defendant, and any claim of irregularity otherwise available 
to the Defendant was waived by his failure to attend the 
trustee's sale and avail himself of available statutory 
safeguards. 
2. 
THE TRUSTEE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
POSTPONE THE TRUSTEE'S SALE. 
Defendant asserts that because Plaintiffs' bid was only for 
the fair market value then remaining to be determined, rather 
than a specific dollar amount, that the trustee did not actually 
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receive a designated price and therefore was required to either 
postpone or re-notice the sale. The obligation of the trustee to 
postpone or re-notice sale is found in § 57-1-27, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. The pertinent part is as follows: 
The person conducting the sale may, for any cause 
he considers expedient, postpone the sale up to a 
period not to exceed 72 hours. Notice of such 
postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last 
appointed for the sale. . . In the event of a longer 
postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and 
renoticed. . . . 
Clearly, the statute places postponement and cancellation 
within the prerogative of the trustee. The only conditions 
imposed have to do with notice of postponement or cancellation. 
Plaintiffs' trustee received their bid, not in a specific dollar 
amount, but nevertheless in a sum certain, that being whatever 
amount then represented the fair market value of the property. 
It was then his obligation to sell the property to Plaintiffs who 
would thereupon be required as a condition of this action, to 
establish to the satisfaction of the trial court the fair market 
value of the property at the time of sale and to credit that 
amount against Defendant's unpaid obligation. 
3. 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO PAY 
FOR THE PROPERTY IN LAWFUL MONEY 
OF THE UNITED STATES AT TIME OF SALE 
Defendant contends without any reference to the record that 
the Defendant, as trustor under the subject deed of trust, had 
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given instructions that the purchase price was "payable in lawful 
money of the United States at the time of sale". There is no 
evidence of such instruction having been given, and it has no 
statutory basis. The issue of payment at the time of trustee's 
sale was not raised below and therefore is not properly raised 
here. 
Plaintiffs request this court take judicial notice that it 
is the standard practice in this jurisdiction for a foreclosing 
beneficiary under a deed of trust to place its bid with the 
trustee at the time of sale. Additionally, that if that bid is 
for an amount equal to or less than the then unpaid balance of 
the obligation for which the deed of trust is given as security 
and the bid is the highest bid received by the trustee, the 
trustee thereupon declares the beneficiary as the successful 
purchaser of the property and executes and delivers his trustee's 
deed to that purchasing beneficiary without requiring the 
beneficiary to make payment to the trustee. 
Utah R. Evid. 201 provides for judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. This court has recognized its power to take 
judicial notice pursuant to the rule although raised for the 
first time on appeal. Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 
758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The matter of which the 
court is requested to take judicial notice is of common knowledge 
among members of the bar and bench of this jurisdiction. 
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The Plaintiffs' trustee acting in accordance with the custom 
in this jurisdiction did not require the Plaintiffs to make 
payment of the amount which they bid as beneficiaries under this 
trust deed. Clearly, the responsibility of the trustee did not 
thereby end with the conclusion of the sale and his execution and 
delivery of his deed. Rather, if it were subsequently determined 
that the fair market value of the property was in excess of the 
amount then owing by Defendant, the trustee would have been 
required to procure and pay over that excess amount to Defendant 
or deposit the same with the Clerk of the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, all in accordance with § 57-1-29, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
The failure of the trustee to require payment by the 
Plaintiffs in lawful money of the United States did not 
invalidate the sale. 
4. 
THE CONDUCT OF THE TRUSTEE'S SALE 
DID NOT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S 
OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN AN APPRAISAL OF 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
The Defendant contends that Plaintiffs by failing to bid a 
specific dollar amount and advise him of the same precluded him 
from timely obtaining an independent appraisal that would have 
been more persuasive to the trial court on the issue of fair 
market value. Plaintiffs were not aware of the fair market value 
of the property at the time of the sale and, therefore, did not 
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give a specific dollar bid. Approximately one month after the 
sale they obtained the Paul Maritsas appraisal indicating a fair 
market value of $21,750.00. Approximately two months later, 
their Complaint was filed alleging a fair market value of 
$22,000.00. 
Defendant testified that he did not attend the sale because 
he believed the property had a fair market value in excess of the 
amount of his obligation to the Plaintiffs. Tr. 170, 171. 
Despite the fact that the action was filed in February of 1988, 
less than three months after the trustee*s sale, the Defendant 
waited until July of 1988 to commission his own appraisal of the 
property. Tr. 137. Plaintiffs did not complete their resale of 
the property until July, 1988. Tr. 19, 51; Plaintiffs1 Exh. 2 at 
3-8. Between the filing of the Complaint on February 22, 1988 
and the said resale of the property, Defendant had over four 
months time in which to commission an appraisal as exacting as 
Defendant and his appraiser desired. Notwithstanding the same, 
Defendant's appraiser testified that he went upon the property, 
entered the house, inspected the basement but did not go up into 
the attic because "I don't carry a ladder with me". Tr. 147, 
148. He did testify as to the general appearance of the property 
and as to its structure as he observed it to be in July of 1988. 
Tr. 147. 
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The evidence ind ica t e s tha t the Defendant had every 
a v a i l a b l e opportuni ty to obtain within a reasonable time 
following the t rus tee ' s sale such appraisals of the property as 
he determined to be appropr ia te . There is nothing in the 
evidence to suggest that his voluntary election to do otherwise 
prejudiced his ab i l i ty to raise a viable defense. In any event, 
responsibi l i ty for any such prejudice would rest with him. 
POINT I I I . 
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT WITH REGARD 
TO THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant contends that the trial court's finding as to fair 
market value of the property as determined by Plaintiffs1 
appraiser, Paul H. Maritsas, is against the weight of the 
evidence. He therefore asserts that the evidence does not 
support the trial court's finding that the Maritsas appraised 
value of $21/750.00 represented fair market value. 
The court's findings were in accord with Rule 52(a) , Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule reads in pertinent part as 
follows: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, . . . . Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. . . 
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The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d 191 
(1987) has adopted the definition of "clearly erroneous" as given 
the Federal counterpart of the Rule in United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 
746 (1948). It is defined as: 
A finding is 'clearly erroneous1 when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
743 P.2d at 193. 
Findings are not disturbed as being clearly erroneous unless 
against the clear weight of the evidence or this court is firmly 
convinced that a mistake has been made. Adair v. Bracken, 745 
P.2d 849, 851 (Utah Ct. of App. 1987). In reviewing the issue as 
to whether findings find support in the evidence, this court 
begins with the review of the trial court's findings and 
Defendant must first marshall all evidence in support of those 
findings and then proceed to establish that such evidence is 
insufficient. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1985). 
Defendant fails to consider the abundant evidence as to 
Plaintiffs' efforts to sell the property. He avoids such by 
wrongfully declaring that "as soon as Mr. Maritsas1 appraisal was 
concluded, Plaintiffs' realtor was ordered to immediately sell 
the property to the neighbor. . . . " He fails to recall that the 
offer upon which sale was effected was not received until six 
months after the appraisal was received. 
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The trial court heard the testimony of Plaintiffs' 
appraiser, Mr. Paul Maritsas, as well as that of Defendant's 
appraiser, Mr. Richard Copeland. The court had the benefit of 
the additional evidence as is reviewed under Point 1, above, and 
then identified in its ruling from the bench the evidence which 
it found persuasive in determining fair market value of the 
property. Tr. 178-180. Specific items were addressed in 
comparing the two appraisals and the court cited what it 
perceived as limitations in Mr. Copeland's appraisal. 
On December 9, 1988, a copy of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by Plaintiffs' attorney were mailed 
to Defendant's attorney. R. 150. On December 20, 1988, 
Defendant filed his objection to the same. R. 146. On 
January 4, 1989, said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were entered by the court. R. 156, 162. A copy of the same is 
appended to this brief. 
The trial court's finding that the property had a fair 
market value on the valuation date of $21,750.00 as determined by 
the Paul H. Maritsas appraisal is clearly supported by the weight 
of the evidence. The Defendant is unable to demonstrate that the 
same is clearly erroneous. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
This action was commenced pursuant to § 57-1-32, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. The Section provides that ". . .the prevailing 
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party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section." 
By their Complaint filed in the action, Plaintiffs sought 
recovery under said Section of their reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in the action. R. 6. The trial court awarded them 
judgment for the same. R. 155. Plaintiffs now seek recovery of 
attorney fees incurred incident to this appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held ". . .that a provision for 
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees 
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, 
if the action is brought to enforce the contract. . . ." 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 
406, 409 (1980). Plaintiffs' claim lies not in contract but 
pursuant to statute. The same considerations which support an 
award of attorney fees on appeal for enforcement of contract 
apply for an action brought pursuant to statute whereby attorney 
fees are provided. 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court determine 
that they are entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred with 
regard to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence which the Defendant now contends was improperly 
refused by the trial court was either not proffered or was 
properly refused. In all events, the refusal did not constitute 
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reversible error. The fact that the Plaintiffs1 bid at the 
trustee's sale was not in a specified dollar amount did not 
either invalidate the sale or deny Defendant his statutory 
safeguards. Disadvantages which he sustained, if anyf are 
attributable to his voluntary election to neither attend the 
trustee's sale nor exercise the rights available to him by 
statute. The findings of fact entered by the trial court are not 
clearly erroneous but supported by the weight of the evidence. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney fees which they incur 
with regard to this appeal. , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2*3 day of February, 1990. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
P 
CERTIFY that on this J^ 3^ ~cfey of February, 1990, I did cause 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondents to be personally delivered to the offices of A. Paul 
Schwenke, Esq. at 165 South West Temple, #300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
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Section 57-1-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Sale of trust property by trustee — Public auction — Conduct by 
attorney for trustee — Trustor may direct order in which trust 
property sold — Bids — Postponement of sale. 
On the date and at the time and place designated in the 
notice of sale, the trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall 
sell the property at public auction to the highest bidder. The 
trustee, or the attorney for the trustee may conduct the sale and 
act at such sale as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his 
successor in interest, if present at the sale, may direct the 
order in which the trust property shall be sold when such 
property consists of several known lots or parcels which can be 
sold to advantage separately, and the trustee, or the attorney 
for the trustee, shall follow such directions. Any person, 
including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every 
bid is considered an irrevocable offer, and if the purchaser 
refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property sold to him 
at the sale, the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may 
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder. The 
party refusing to pay the bid price is liable for any loss 
occasioned thereby, including interest, costs, and trustee's and 
reasonable attorney's fees. The trustee or the attorney for the 
trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he 
considers expedient, postpone the sale up to a period not to 
exceed 72 hours. Notice of such postponement shall be given by 
public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place 
last appointed for the sale. No other notice of the postponed 
sale need be given unless the sale is postponed for longer than 
72 hours beyond the date designated in the notice of sale. In 
the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled 
and renoticed as provided for herein in the same manner as the 
original notice of sale is required to be given. 
Section 57-1-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Sale of trust property by trustee — Payment of bid —Trustee's 
deed delivered to purchaser — Recitals — Effect. 
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price bid as 
directed by the trustee and upon receipt of payment, the trustee 
shall execute and deliver his deed to such purchaser. The 
trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the 
requirements of §§ 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the 
exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described 
therein, including recitals concerning any mailing, personal 
delivery, and publication of the notice of default, any mailing 
and the publication and posting of the notice of sale, and the 
conduct of sale. These recitals constitute prima facie evidence 
of such compliance and are conclusive evidence in favor of bona 
fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice. 
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the 
purchaser, without right of redemption, the trustee's title and 
all right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor and his 
successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, 
or under them, in and to the property sold, including all such 
right, title, interest, and claim in and to such property 
acquired by the trustor or his successors in interest subsequent 
to the execution of the trust deed. 
Section 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to recover balance 
due upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security— 
Collection of costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property 
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action 
the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for 
which such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof 
at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall 
find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property 
sold. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount 
by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of 
the sale. In any action brought under this section, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under 
this section. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN M. THOMAS, ELSIE 
MERRILL, LEWIS J. MERRILL, 
STEPHEN J. MERRILL, ALVIN S. 
MERRILL, GEORGE A. MERRILL, 
MARGARET M. DURFEE and 
ANNIE M. DUTSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, also known as 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C88-01121 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter having come on for trial on the 2nd day of 
December, 1988, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, one of 
the judges of the Court, with Gary A. Weston of the firm of 
Nielsen & Senior appearing as attorney for the Plaintiffs, and A, 
Paul Schwenke appearing as attorney for the Defendant. At the 
commencement of trial and in response to Plaintiffs' Motion in 
Liminef Defendant withdrew his request to call Philip Cook to 
testify as an expert witness. The Court then proceeded with trial 
and the taking of testimony and receipt of exhibits by way of 
evidence on the issues, and counsel having addressed the Court 
regarding application of law to the evidence presented, the Court 
now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 24, 1987, the property commonly known as 
448 North Grant Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the 
"subject property"), was sold to Plaintiffs at trustee's sale. 
2. The sale was undertaken and consummated in response 
to Defendant's failure to make payment to Plaintiffs of certain of 
the monthly payments provided to be paid pursuant to the terms of 
a trust deed note signed by Defendant incident to Defendant's 
purchase of the subject property from Plaintiffs and the payment 
of which promissory note Defendant collateralized by a trust deed 
which he signed and delivered to Plaintiffs therein describing the 
subject property. 
3. Defendant knew of the payment delinquency under the 
promissory note and received notice from Plaintiffs of said 
delinquency and of the scheduled trustee's sale of the subject 
property. 
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4. Defendant had the opportunity to attend the 
trustee's sale of the subject property, but did not do so. 
5. Plaintiffs made the only bid received by the trustee 
at the trustee's sale. Plaintiffs did not then know the fair 
market value of the subject property, but declared their bid to be 
for the amount of the fair market value of the property, whatever 
be that value. 
6. Plaintiffs caused an appraisal to be performed of 
the subject property by Paul H. Maritsas for the purpose of 
determining fair market value of the property. The appraisal was 
completed on December 23, 1987 (Exhibit P-3). The appraisal 
estimated the fair market value as of December 23, 1987 to be 
$21,750.00. 
7. On December 7, 1987 Plaintiffs listed the subject 
property for sale with a licensed real estate salesperson. The 
property was then listed at a sales price of $32,900.00. On or 
about January 27, 1988, the listing price was lowered to 
$21,750.00. 
8. Suitable efforts to find a purchaser for the subject 
property and to sell and market the property were made by 
Plaintiffs and the salesperson with whom Plaintiffs listed the 
property for sale. 
9. In June, 1988, Plaintiffs received an offer from 
Larry D. Hyde and Kathleen J. Hyde to purchase the subject 
property at a price of $20,500.00. Plaintiffs determined 
reluctantly to accept said offer. The subject property was sold 
by Plaintiffs to Larry D. Hyde and Kathleen J. Hyde on or about 
July 13, 1988 for the price of $20,500.00. 
10. The offer received by Plaintiffs from Larry D. Hyde 
and Kathleen J. Hyde was the only offer received by Plaintiffs for 
the purchase of the subject property. 
11. The subject property was in need of structural 
repair to roof rafters as of November 24, 1987, and the then 
condition of the property significantly impacted fair market value. 
12. On July 6, 1988, Defendant requested Richard W. 
Koplin to conduct an appraisal of the subject property to 
determine the fair market value of the property. The appraisal 
was completed July 7, 1988 and estimated the fair market value of 
the property to be $31,800.00 as of November 27, 1987 (Exhibit 
D-5). Mr. Koplin in performing his appraisal did not inspect the 
attic of the subject property nor make sufficient adjustment to 
his estimated value of the property to reflect the condition of 
the property. 
13. As of November 24, 1987, the date of the trustee's 
sale of the subject property, Defendant was indebted to Plaintiffs 
under the promissory note and deed of trust in an amount of 
$29,622.62, as more particularly itemized in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1. 
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14. As of November 24, 1987, the date of the trustee's 
sale of the subject property, the fair market value of said 
property was $21,750.00. 
15. Plaintiffs incurred costs, expenses and trustee fees 
as a result and consequence of Defendant's delinquency under the 
promissory note and of Plaintiffs' foreclosure against the subject 
property of the trust deed received from Defendant to secure the 
payment of the promissory note. Plaintiffs made payment to Gary 
A. Weston, Attorney at Law, as substitute trustee thereunder said 
trust deed for his services relative to the foreclosure of the 
trust deed. Fees of $1,059.00 and costs of $354.70 were so paid. 
Said fees and costs are fair and reasonable with regard to the 
services rendered to Plaintiffs. 
16. Plaintiffs have incurred attorney fees in an amount 
of $4,980.00 with regard to the herein action. Said fees are fair 
and reasonable with regard to the services rendered to Plaintiffs 
by their attorneys. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters its Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. The trustee's sale of the subject property conducted 
on November 24, 1987 constituted a valid and proper exercise of 
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the rights and power of sale granted by Defendant to Plaintiffs 
under Defendant's trust deed given against the subject property 
and as granted by Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
2. Pursuant to the bid made by Plaintiffs at trustee's 
sale and Plaintiffs' purchase of the subject property at sale as a 
consequence of that bid, Plaintiffs must credit Defendant with an 
amount of $21,750.00 against the total amount owing by Defendant 
to Plaintiffs at time of trustee's sale, the amount of said credit 
being the fair market value of the subject property at the time of 
trustee's sale and which credit is required by § 57-1-32, Utah 
Code Ann. 
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendant, 
pursuant to § 57-1-32, Utah Code Ann., Plaintiffs1 attorney fees 
incurred in this action. 
4. Plaintiffs are not barred by the doctrines of 
estoppel, waiver, release, laches, or either of the same, from 
recovery against the Defendant. 
5. Judgment should be entered in favor of the 
Plaintiffs and against the Defendant pursuant to § 57-1-32, Utah 
Code Ann., as follows: 
(a) For an amount of $7,872.62. 
(b) For attorney fees in an amount of $4,980.00. 
-6-
(c) For Plaintiffs' costs herein incurred. 
DATED this 
BY THE, COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
A. Paul Schwenke 
Attorney for Defendant 
58311 
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